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CUSTOMER SATISFACTION AND FIRM PROFITS IN MONOPOLIES: A STUDY OF 
UTILITIES  
 
Abstract 
There is a growing body of evidence that customer satisfaction is predictive of firms future 
financial performance. However, studies of this relationship have been limited to competitive 
markets and monopolistic markets have been largely ignored. In this study, we explore the large 
and important utilities market and exploit its unique regulatory requirements that generate detailed 
and reliable operating and accounting data to examine the overall relationship between customer 
satisfaction and utility profit, and establish the causal mechanisms involved. Using data from U.S. 
public utility firms we show that even when customer satisfaction does not affect future revenues, 
it does positively predict future profitability by reducing utility firm operating costs. More 
specifically, we find that higher satisfaction reduces the costs of utility firm distribution, customer 
service, and sales and general administration expenses. These findings and additional post-hoc 
evidence we present are consistent with customer satisfaction generating efficiency-enhancing 
benefits for utility firms via lowering the direct and employee engagement costs of dealing with 
dissatisfied customers and generating greater trust and cooperation from customers. This study has 
important implications for both managers and regulators, and provides important new insights for 
market-based asset theory and regulatory economic theory. 
 
Keywords: Customer Satisfaction; Firm Performance; Public Utilities; Operating Costs; 
Firm Efficiency. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In competitive markets, the positive effect of customer satisfaction on firm performance has been 
well documented (e.g., Aksoy et al. 2008; Anderson, Fornell, and Mazvancheryl 2004; Anderson 
and Mansi 2009). Satisfying customers is therefore a key goal for firms in such markets (e.g., 
Gruca and Rego 2005; Morgan and Rego 2006). However, little is known about satisfactions 
effects in monopolistic markets such as utilities where customer choices are limited. As a result, 
utility managers are unsure how much to invest in satisfying customersif anything at all since 
most customers have no alternative supplier choices (e.g., PWC 2015; Strategy& 2014). For 
example, in exploratory interviews a utilitys COO commented: Utility executives dont know 
whether and how much payoff they may expect from investments in increasing customer 
satisfaction. Similarly, a utility CEO suggested: I think that increasing my customers 
satisfaction is the right thing to do, but I dont know how much to spend in doing so because the 
returns I should expect are not clear. This issue is also of interest to regulators who in the 
absence of competition are responsible for protecting utility customers. Whether or not customer 
satisfaction should be a part of regulator efforts to incent and monitor utilities is a debated 
question, with the answer depending on whether utilities otherwise have economic incentives to 
satisfy their customers (e.g., Makholm 2018; McNamara and Winter 2013; Tirole 2015). 
The effect of customer satisfaction in utility markets is also theoretically interesting. Such 
natural monopolies are economically important suppliers of continuously delivered offerings 
that are difficult for customers to do without (e.g., power, water) in which geographic franchise 
arrangements make competition practically difficult (Borenstein and Bushnell 2015; Mergent 
2016). As a result, these markets are usually regulated to protect customers (Posner 1999). 
With limited choices, the customer satisfaction-firm performance relationship may be expected 
to be different than in unregulated competitive markets. However, the theoretical literature in 
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economics and marketing offer differing viewpoints. Regulatory economics theory suggests that 
providing anything more than minimal customer satisfaction is a discretionary expense that 
reduces utility profits (e.g., Crew and Kleindorfer 2002; Karlsen and Pettyfer 2011). In contrast, 
market-based asset theory in marketing posits that satisfied customers are a relational asset that 
help increase firm profits and shareholder value (e.g., Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 1998)
but does not consider whether and how this may work in monopolistic regulated market settings. 
This study addresses this important and theoretically interesting question and offers 
several contributions. First, using data covering the U.S. public utility industry for the period 
2001-2017, we find robust evidence that customer satisfaction is significantly positively related 
to utility firms future profits. This has important implications for utility managers and 
shareholders. Our results show utility managers that customer satisfaction is a key business 
metric that should be tracked, and a valuable intangible asset which they should invest in 
enhancing to maximize profits. Furthermore, shareholders should welcome utility investments in 
improving customer satisfaction. Our results also have implications for marketing theory as it 
suggests that market-based asset theorywhich underpins most explanations for the satisfaction-
firm performance relationshipcan be extended to such regulated markets. To-date, researchers 
have either assumed that customer satisfaction is unimportant in regulated monopolistic markets, 
or excluded them from their theorizing and empirical studies as being idiosyncratic.  
Second, this studys findings reveal that the mechanism for the satisfaction-profit 
relationship observed in utility markets is through decreasing firms operating costs in serving 
their customers. In addition, we find evidence consistent with the underlying reasons for this 
effect of satisfaction on operating costs being via reduced direct and indirect costs to deal with 
customer complaints and cost savings from firm introduced changes and technologies that 
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benefit from greater customer trust and goodwill. Our study supports the recent findings of Lim, 
Tuli, and Grewal (2020) in offering evidence of lower operating costs as an important efficiency-
enhancing benefit of satisfying customers. It also suggests additional cost-reducing mechanisms 
that should be explored in studies of how satisfaction contributes to firm performance in other 
types of markets. 
Third, our findings also have implications for economic theory and utility regulators. For 
regulatory economic theory, our findings suggest a new mechanism by which utility firm and 
customer incentives may be aligned. Specifically, we show that as currently regulated via control 
of price-setting and setting minimum quality levels utilities have a cost-based incentive to satisfy 
their customers. This suggests that utility investments in providing customer satisfaction are 
rational and profit maximizing rather than discretionary. For policy-makers, our findings that 
customer satisfaction does not lead to increased profits via higher rates or greater demand 
suggests current regulatory controls are effective. In addition, since we control for both price 
(rates) and quality (outages) in our analysesand show a negative effect of customer satisfaction 
on utility firm operating costs beyond that explained by these two variablesour findings 
suggest regulators should view investments in customer satisfaction as recoverable costs.  
In the next section, we first present conceptual arguments regarding the mechanisms by 
which satisfaction may be linked with firm profits and explore how each of these may (or may 
not) work in a regulated utility market. We then describe the data set assembled, detail how we 
empirically test the relationships of interest, and present and discuss the results. Finally, we 
outline the limitations of the study, consider its implications for marketing and economic theory, 
and provide actionable recommendations for both managers and public policy-makers. 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND INDUSTRY CONTEXT 
Market-based asset (MBA) theory has been the primary theory lens applied in studying the 
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customer satisfaction-firm performance relationship. From this perspective, satisfaction indicates 
the health of a firms customer relationshipsa relational asset that generates future cash flows 
by: (i) increasing cash inflows via allowing higher price premiums, lower customer churn, 
enhanced customer responsiveness to new products and marketing programs, and stronger brand 
equity and word-of-mouth attracting new customers; and, (ii) reducing cash outflows directly by 
lowering the cost of sales and service, and reducing required working capital and fixed 
investments, and indirectly by reducing cash flow volatility which lowers the firms cost of 
capital (Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 1998). Thus, customer satisfaction is theorized to affect 
a firms future profits via its ability to both increase firm revenue and reduce firm costs. 
Studies in competitive markets, reveal some empirical support for theorized revenue-
enhancing links at the customer- (e.g., Homburg, Koschate, and Hoyer 2005; Wangenheim and 
Bayón 2007) and firm-levels (e.g., Fornell et al. 1996; Morgan and Rego 2006). On the cost-
reducing side, while some attention has been paid to the efficiency with which satisfaction is 
created (e.g., Anderson, Fornell, and Rust 1997; Mittal et al. 2005), only recently has evidence 
emerged concerning the satisfaction-cost linkage (Lim, Tuli, and Grewal 2020). However, since 
the firm-level effects of customer satisfaction have not previously been explored in non-
competitive markets, and MBA theory does not distinguish between different kinds of markets in 
its core propositions, it is unclear how the theorized revenue and cost mechanisms may work (if 
at all) in regulated utility markets.  
We therefore begin with the general case developed in MBA theorizing, and explore how 
each of the suggested routes by which satisfaction may affect firm-level outcomes may or may 
not be different in regulated utility markets. As shown in Figure 1, the literature suggests four 
routes linking higher customer satisfaction with firm profits: (i) by increasing customer demand 
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for the firms offerings; (ii) by reducing customer price sensitivity and allowing the firm to sell 
its output at higher prices; (iii) by reducing the fixed costs required to produce and deliver the 
firms offerings; and (iv) by reducing the variable operating costs to market, deliver, and service 
the firms offerings. While all four of these routes may be viable in competitive settings, this is 
unlikely to be the case in regulated public utility markets for a number of reasons.  
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
First, utility customers share a basic need for power that is independent of the suppliers 
performance. Thus, a customers unit demand is not likely to be directly affected by their 
satisfaction with their utility suppliercustomers are unlikely to consume more power as a result 
of being more satisfied or vice versa. Furthermore, because geographic franchise arrangements 
make competition practically difficult, most utility markets offer only one choice of supplier 
(Posner 1999). This may not be much of a choice for most consumers since they face high 
switching costs with respect to substitutes (i.e. going off the grid) as evidenced by the very 
small number in the U.S. that have done so (EIA 2017).1 Thus, dissatisfied customers are 
unlikely to either defect or to significantly reduce their consumption (e.g., Morey and Kirsch 
2016; PWC 2015). In addition, a utilitys customers are determined solely by their geographic 
location i.e. a utility only gains new customers when they move into that utilitys service area. 
Thus, even though satisfied customers may be more likely to engage in positive word-of-mouth, 
non-customers have no ability to switch their utility provider in response.1 However, utilities do 
have regulatory incentives to encourage customers to conserve energy, and engage in Demand 
                                                          
1 While substitute technologies have improved over time and their costs fallen, Energy Information Agency (EIA) 
data on net metering indicates that in 2017 0.1% of residential customers produce their own power, and less than 1 
million people use any supplementary alternative energy source (https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia861m/). 
1 Some so called Choice States have experimented with some limited retail utility provider choice. We exclude 
these from our main sample but include them in later robustness and generalizability assessments. 
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Side Management (DSM) programs designed to this end (Loughran and Kulick 2004). If 
satisfied customers are more responsive to such programs it is possible that satisfaction may be 
associated with lowered unit demand. We therefore examine this possibility in our analyses. 
A utility may also have strategic reasons for seeking to increase customer satisfaction. 
For example, utilities can (with regulator approval) also operate in unregulated markets (e.g., 
selling back-up generators, providing home security services, etc.), and might therefore invest in 
customer satisfaction in order to provide opportunities and returns in their unregulated businesses 
(e.g., Braeutigam and Panzar 1989).2 We therefore control for any such effects in our analyses. 
In addition, while switching barriers are still high, over time the availability of substitutes for 
utility service has been increasing and their relative cost decreasing. Thus, a forward-looking 
utility may seek to enhance customer satisfaction to reduce incentives for customers to explore 
substitutes, and for potential substitute providers to view the utilitys customers as a disruption 
opportunity (e.g., Holmes, Levine, and Schmitz 2012). However, while increasing customer 
satisfaction may have such positive longer-term defensive payoffs, there is no theory or evidence 
to suggest that these will materially increase either short-term demand or profits. Nonetheless, 
we allow for this possibility empirically by examining the effect of satisfaction on demand. 
Second, consumer protection in the absence of competition is provided by regulators. 
Regulators achieve this by setting the prices per unit (rates) that utilities can charge customers, 
establishing and monitoring minimum quality standards to ensure customer access to reliable 
service, and providing incentives for firms to increase efficiency (e.g., Laffont and Tirole 1994; 
Makholm 2018). Thus, regulators do not set (or cap) utility dollar profits. Rather, they determine 
                                                          
2 These are excluded in regulators determination of the utility firms revenue requirement and rates but are included 
in the firms accounting statements of revenues and net income. We focus only on revenues, costs, and profits from 
each firms utility operations in our analyses, and control for their non-utility profits.   
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the revenue requirements for the utility that will deliver a reasonable rate of return on the 
required capital investments, and allow them to recover unavoidable costs incurred in providing 
customer access to service subject to meeting required certain objective quality levels and 
efficiency improvement targets (Joskow 2013; Vogelsang 2002) [See Web Appendix A8 for 
further details]. When establishing the revenue requirement, regulators determine the price (rate) 
the utility is allowed to charge customers for each unit of power to deliver thisand take no 
account of customer satisfaction in doing so.3 Thus, even if satisfied utility customers were less 
price sensitive, a utility cannot raise its prices to exploit this revenue opportunity. 
With many of the demand-side benefits of satisfying customers likely to be either 
diminished or effectively unavailable in regulated public utility markets, any relationship with 
utility profits may be more likely to flow through the cost-side route.4 In the U.S., regulators 
require access to each utility firms costs to identify unavoidable costs to deliver reliable 
service, set utility prices, and set and monitor progress against mandated efficiency targets. To 
enable this, a federal agency (the Energy Information Administration) is tasked with auditing and 
collecting utility cost data in a standardized way at a more granular level than in most other 
industries. This granular and comparable utility cost data is also publicly available, providing the 
opportunity to study the potential effects of satisfaction on utility firm costs in detail. 
In terms of the cost-side of the satisfaction-profit relationship, utility markets are 
characterized by component commonality (the major cost-drivers for the deliverable product or 
service are similar), and substantial production and distribution complexity. Under such 
                                                          
3 To allow for the possibility that a utilitys customer satisfaction could conceivably informally affect regulator 
decision-making during rate case negotiations regarding rates of return and allowable costs, we include utility unit 
prices in our analyses of potential satisfaction-profit mechanisms. 
4 Utilities have strong incentives to reduce costs as regulators set efficiency targets and monitor cost performance, 
with substantial penalties and review costs for failures to meet targets (e.g., Makholm 2018; PWC 2015). 
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circumstances customer satisfaction is unlikely to have any significant effect in reducing a 
number of utility firm costs of productionparticularly since unit demand is less likely to be 
significantly affected by customer satisfaction than in competitive markets. Therefore, utility 
firm costs involved in producing power are unlikely to be affected by customer satisfaction. To 
ensure this expectation is correct, we also check this relationship in our analyses.  
However, customer satisfaction may impact operating costs that a utility firm incurs in 
serving customers. Since the conceptual literature on potential linkages between customer 
satisfaction and firm costs is relatively undeveloped, we supplemented this with insights from a 
number of exploratory interviews with senior industry executives, and a focus group with 
industry managers and employees. Specifically, using a snowball sampling approach we 
interviewed five utility CEOs and one COO, one VP of a satisfaction-tracking service for the 
industry, and the President of a leading utility industry association. The focus group comprised 
fifteen managers and employees of different utilities that were attending a leading industry event. 
These allowed us to qualitatively explore potential reasons why a number of different operating 
costs for utilities may conceivably be lower for firms with higher customer satisfaction. 
Combined with insights from the extant conceptual literature, these suggest that customer 
satisfaction may impact utility operating costs via two key mechanisms. 
First, studies in competitive industries show that higher customer satisfaction leads to 
reductions in customer complaints (Fornell et al. 1996). This effect has also been observed by 
utility managers that we interviewed. The cost of quality literature posits that increasing 
customer satisfaction reduces firm costs involved in dealing with non-quality such as field 
service and handling and managing complaints (e.g., Huff, Fornell, and Anderson 1996). In the 
utility case, interviewed managers suggested that this may translate into a lower volume of 
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customer service calls and walk-ins to service centers and thus lower the cost of dealing with 
customers, which should reduce firms customer service expenditures.  
Both utility managers and employees suggested that higher levels of customer 
satisfaction also mean that customer-facing employees deal with fewer unhappy customers. This 
may result in indirect cost savings via productivity benefits resulting from greater employee 
satisfaction and engagement (e.g., Koys 2001; Schmit and Allscheid 1995). Additionally, it was 
suggested that fewer employee interactions with irate and complaining customers may also lead 
to lower employee stress, which in turn both reduces absenteeism and lowers healthcare costs. 
Higher levels of customer satisfaction may also improve employee satisfaction and decrease 
employee turnover, further lowering employee costs and raising productivity.  
Second, higher satisfaction also leads to greater customer trust inand goodwill 
towardsthe utility (e.g., Garbarino and Johnson 1999). Our interviews suggest that this may 
produce cost savings in a number of areas. For example, regulators obligate utilities to provide 
service, and in most cases they cannot discontinue service for a customer without lengthy and 
expensive legal recourseand this usually results in a bad debt. Higher customer satisfaction has 
been linked with reduced bad debt in the academic literature (e.g., Pike and Cheng 2001). The 
utility trade press also suggests that satisfied customers are more likely to pay their bills and to 
do so on time, both lowering bad debt and accelerating cash inflows (e.g., Sharam 2007). 
Increased trust and goodwill arising from satisfaction may also lead to faster and greater 
acceptance of firm introduced changes in product/services (Ernst 2002), some of which could 
deliver cost benefits to utilities. For example, DSM is key to enabling utilities to realize 
substantial cost savings and they encourage customers to limit their demand by sharing data on 
their consumption and providing energy efficiency services (Loughran and Kulick 2004). They 
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also ask customers to allow them to install and operate peak demand limiters to help balance 
power load, reduce outages, and lower distribution costs. Customers with goodwill towards the 
utility are more likely to follow their energy consumption advice, accept demand limiters, and 
trust the firm to manage their consumption when required (MacGill and Smith 2017). They are 
also more likely to use online self-service customer service technologies and paperless billing 
systems introduced by the firm which can lower costs to serve. Goodwill is also useful to utilities 
in enabling them to gain access to customers property in order to maintain and upgrade utility 
equipment. While utilities may have legal rights of way to important equipment in many cases, 
our interviews suggested that customers can still slow their efforts to access such equipment. In 
addition, access and permission to trim trees and vegetation on customers property affects 
utilities ability to engage in planned maintenance and thereby reduce overall distribution costs. 
Overall, as depicted in Figure1 the literature and fieldwork therefore suggests that while 
all routes should be empirically examined, customer satisfaction is most likely to be linked with 
utility firm profits via an effect on operating costs.  
DATA 
Data covering U.S. public utility firms are used to test the relationships described. We used the 
American Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI) as our sampling frame as this been the primary 
data source used in studying customer satisfaction-firm performance relationships in competitive 
markets. We collected firm-level customer satisfaction data for all publicly-traded U.S. utility 
companies for the years 2001 through 2017. The ACSI customer satisfaction score is a latent 
variable for each firm/year (see Fornell et al. 1996). These data were matched with additional 
customer, firm, industry, and market data, collected from the Energy Information Administration 
(EIA), Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), and COMPUSTAT databases. 
Examining the relationships of interest also requires data on utility firm profits and its 
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components: rates (unit prices); unit sales volume (demand); and costs. We obtain data for each 
of these variables from the EIA database. The EIA collects utility firm operating reports and 
subjects them to a rigorous data quality assurance program that includes over 800 computerized 
checks as well as routine audits by EIA staff, providing a high degree of accuracy, consistent line 
of business definitions, and standardized accounting procedures. For each utility firm, the EIA 
data are also reported by State (since some utilities serve customers in more than one State) and 
customer type (residential, commercial, and industrial). Since the ACSI does not survey 
business-to-business (B2B) customers, we included only EIA data items for residential 
customers in constructing the measures used in our empirical analyses.  
Profits: the difference between net operating revenue (data item UOPEREUCO) and net 
operating expense (data item UOPEXE) for the utilitys regulated energy business (all non-
regulated diversified business is excluded), using EIA data items for residential customers only. 
Rates: EIA provides data on average rates charged per unit of power sold to residential 
customers, by each utility firm for each year (data item UAVGAREB) reported as cents/Kwh.  
Sales Volume: EIA provides data on each utilitys unit demand volume (data item 
USALEEUC) to capture the number of units (Kwh) sold to residential customers.  
Utility Costs: all costs incurred in serving residential customers (i.e. total utility expenses 
attributable to serving residential customer accounts). The EIA collects data on all costs incurred 
by public utilities. Based on insights from our interviews and focus group and following the logic 
detailed in our conceptual development we classify these costs into two mutually exclusive 
categories: Satisfaction Varying Operating Costs (SVOC) i.e. those that may be affected by 
customer satisfaction and All Other Costs (that should not be affected by satisfaction). Any cost 
items not reported separately for different types of utility customers are converted to represent 
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residential customer-related costs by using the ratio of residential-to-total customers served. 
Satisfaction Varying Operating Costs (SVOC):  
Customer Service Expenses: Total operating expenses incurred in customer service, 
accounting, and collection activities for residential customers (data item UOPECA). This 
includes costs incurred in: (a) customer records and collection expenses; (b) meter reading 
expenses; (c) miscellaneous customer accounts expenses; and (d) supervision expenses. 
Increases in customer satisfaction are likely to reduce such overall customer service expenses.  
Salaries: The firms total salaries and wages paid to permanent employees (data item 
USW). Increases in customer satisfaction may lead to improved employee engagement and 
productivity, which may reduce the utilitys salaries expense in serving residential customers.  
Bad Debt: Total expenses associated with bad debt due to uncollectible customer 
accounts (data item UOPECNC). Higher customer satisfaction may decrease bad debt expense. 
Sales and General Expenses: Expenses incurred with regard to office rent and 
administration, property insurance, pensions and benefits, and other general expenses including: 
advertising; miscellaneous general expenses; office supplies and expenses; part-time employee 
salaries; outside services employed; and, regulatory commission expenses (data item UOPEAG). 
Some of these costs may decrease with customer satisfaction, via customers improved 
acceptance of firm introduced new technologies that reduce customer-facing office requirements. 
Distribution Costs: Total expenses associated with the operational costs incurred in utility 
power distribution (data item UOPED) to residential customers. Overall, we expect that these 
costs may decrease with customer satisfaction via improved customer acceptance and use of new 
technologies and greater access to plant and equipment on residential customers property.  
Following the classification and description of the costs listed above, and the theoretical 
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rationale discussed earlier, we calculate an overall SVOC measure by aggregating all five of 
these operating expenses that may be customer satisfaction dependent (i.e. Customer Service 
Expenses, Salaries, Bad Debt, Sales and General Expenses, and Distribution Costs). We use this 
SVOC measure to test our operating cost-related path linking satisfaction with profits. 
All Other Costs: 
Costs of Production: Total expenses associated with the purchase, generation, and 
maintenance of the companys energy supply (data items UEPPEXP and UGPPEXP).  
Fuel Costs: Total cost of fuel used to produce electricity or gas (data item UFCOSTT). 
Maintenance Costs: Contract labor, materials and other direct and indirect expenses 
incurred for preserving the operating efficiency or physical condition of utility plant used for 
electric power (or gas) production, transmission and distribution of energy and administrative 
and general operations. For gas companies, this also includes maintenance of storage plant (data 
items UMEE for electricity, and UMEGW for gas utilities).  
Depreciation Costs: Charges made against income to provide for distributing the cost of 
depreciable electric plant, less estimated net salvage over the estimated useful life of the asset 
(data items UXDPE for electric, and UXDPGW for gas utilities). 
We also include several firm-level and customer-level controls in our empirical models.  
Firm-Level Controls 
Utility Type Index: Indicates the % of revenue from sales of electricity vs. gas that a 
utility reports to the EIA. Since electricity or gas are different products (sold at different 
margins), the type of utility supplied to customers may influence overall firm profits. 
Firm Size: We use the firms reported total assets obtained from COMPUSTAT (item 
AT) as an indicator of firm size. Larger firms may experience greater efficiencies of scale, 
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potentially leading to differences in operating costs and profitability. 
Diversification: We use COMPUSTAT segment data to calculate firm diversification, 
operationalized as the proportion of the utility firms total revenue obtained from operations in 
non-utility markets (Johnson, Hoskisson, and Hitt 1993). This is included as a control to account 
for utilities that may seek to satisfy their regulated market customers as a way of encouraging 
cross-buying from them in different unregulated markets. We only include profits, costs and 
demand from utility firms regulated businesses in our empirical models.  
Outages: To control for variance attributable to quality, we use FERC data on the impact 
of power outages on residential customers served. For each firm, we calculate an annual outage 
index consisting of the number of outages per firm-year, the total number of residential 
customers affected by outages, and the duration of outages. Outages may reduce both satisfaction 
and firm profits (costs are incurred for repairs and revenue is lost during an outage).  
Rates: To control for any potential variance attributable to price, we include rates as a 
control for the cost-based model.  
Customer-Level Controls 
Demographics: We control for the demographic profile of residential customer 
population served (i.e., age, gender, ethnicity and household income) as demographics can affect 
utility consumption (and thus revenue) (e.g., Brounen, Kok, and Quigley 2012) and influence 
customer satisfaction (e.g., Smith, Bolton, and Wagner 1999). Demographic data was gathered 
from the U.S. Census Bureau database. For utilities with operations in multiple States, the 
demographic data was weighted by the firms proportion of residential revenues from each State. 
The ACSI collects customer satisfaction data annually for utility firms during January 
through December. These data are released annually by the ACSI in the following March, which 
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are matched with current year annual data reported by the EIA and FREC databases, released at 
the end of November (describing utility firms data for the previous calendar and fiscal year). We 
assemble the measures described above by pooling data across these multiple sources, which we 
match to the financial-accounting data from the COMPUSTAT database. As all investor-owned 
utilities in our database have December fiscal year ends, the ACSI, EIA, FREC and 
COMPUSTAT data are aligned chronologically. After compiling and merging data from the 
sources described above, and following the elimination of firms for which three or fewer years of 
consecutive data is available and those operating in Choice States, our database contains 478 
firm-year observations, representing 38 investor owned (i.e., public) utilities over 18 years, from 
2000 through 2017. Table 1 summarizes descriptive statistics and correlations for the main 
variables of interest. Appendix 1 provides formal definitions and operationalizations for all 
measures used in our empirical analyses and subsequent robustness checks. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 & APPENDIX 1 HERE] 
METHODOLOGY 
Our sample is a moderately unbalanced panel, which allows us to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity but is susceptible to other econometric concerns (e.g., autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity). To deal with these concerns we use a fixed-effects (FE) correction 
supplemented with year fixed effects to address unobserved heterogeneity, as suggested by the 
Hausman test. We also use heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) standard 
errors, which yield unbiased and efficient t-statistics (Stock and Watson 2008) and 
accommodates for moderately unbalanced panels (Wooldridge 2010).  
Endogeneity is also a concern in such data sets and can influence estimates via 
simultaneity, reverse causality, and omitted variable bias (presence of endogenous regressors), 
creating identification challenges that need to be addressed. First, in addition to controlling for 
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unobserved heterogeneity, the inclusion of year fixed effects also control for exogenous shocks 
such as business cycles (Lim, Tuli, and Grewal 2020), which can influence both firm profits and 
customer satisfaction and therefore are potential sources of endogeneity. Similarly, the inclusion 
of firm fixed effects allows us to alleviate concerns with respect to time-invariant omitted 
variables such as corporate culture (Germann, Ebbes and Grewal 2015), which are also potential 
sources of endogeneity. Simultaneity may also be a potential source of endogeneity in testing the 
relationship between customer satisfaction and utility profits because some of the dependent 
variables may be hard-wired from an accounting perspective (i.e., unit sales, costs and rates are 
positively correlated)raising concerns about codependence of the error terms. We address 
these concerns by jointly estimating all model specifications whose error terms may be 
correlated as a system of equations, while allowing the error term on each equation to covary.5 
Lastly, we address potential firm-specific omitted variable endogeneity by including a set of rich 
firm-level time-variant covariates (Wooldridge 2010). 
The remaining endogeneity concerns are addressed as follows. We mitigate potential 
reverse causalitycurrent period profits could be reinvested to enhance customer satisfaction, in 
which case current period profits could be an omitted variableby temporally separating the 
dependent variable from its predictors, which are lagged one time period. Additionally, despite 
the corrections listed above, it is not possible to argue that we include all potential predictors of 
both profits and satisfaction in our models. For example, there remain other potential time-
variant omitted variables such as firm-level management abilitywhich may influence both firm 
profits (Anderson, Chandy, and Zia 2018; Bloom and Van Reenen 2007) and customer 
                                                          
5 We use conditional mixed-process models to estimate the simultaneous equations. This jointly estimates a 
recursive set of equations that mix different model specifications, while still enabling use of instruments, and 
controlling for potential simultaneity endogeneity by allowing each equations error terms to correlate. 
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satisfaction (Wirtz and Zeithaml 2018). Since reverse causality can also be constructed as a 
variation of omitted variable bias, where the omitted variable varies over time (Wooldridge 
2010), we therefore use a standard two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach with an appropriate 
instrumental variable as our identification strategy. Absent natural experiments or policy 
interventions, this approach allows the demonstration and estimation of a causal effect since 
valid instruments affect the outcome only via a specific treatment (i.e., approximating 
randomized control trials). We use average satisfaction with local Cable TV providers serving 
each utilitys customers as our instrument since as detailed below it is both relevant (i.e. 
conceptually correlates with the utility customer satisfaction variable that is endogenous) and 
valid (i.e. satisfies the exclusion restriction).  
First, in terms of relevance, customer satisfaction formation is a disconfirmation process 
based on customers expectations of a product or service (Oliver 2014). Woodruff et al. (1983) 
theorize that customers have a distribution of relevant experiences that provide them with norms 
on which they base performance expectations for a focal providerincluding experiences with 
both similar brands and similar products. Aligned with this it has been shown that customer 
expectations ofand via (dis)confirmation satisfaction withone provider are influenced by 
their experiences with other suppliers (e.g., Cadotte, Woodruff, and Jenkins 1987; Keiningham et 
al. 2014), and that peers with similar characteristics have greater influence (e.g., Woodruff, 
Cadotte, and Jenkins 1983). However, these studies are of competing suppliers and products 
within the same category while in our natural monopoly context, customers experiences with 
other utilities is usually very limited (many have only experienced their current utility). Thus, we 
follow Woodruff et al.s (1983) logic that customers draw on experiences with other similar 
providers to inform their expectations, and thereby influence their satisfaction with utility service 
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but extend the identification of similar providers beyond the power utility category.  
To identify the most relevant non-power utility similar providers we draw on the 
psychology literature which shows that consumer learning about categories is facilitated by the 
similarity between objects, with similarity judgments involving an alignment process in which 
features are placed in correspondence (e.g., Lassaline and Murphy 1998). In the marketing 
literature, this has been shown in terms of how consumers make comparisons from other 
categories and draw inferences and judgments about really new products for which there are 
no direct referents (e.g., Gregan-Paxton and Moreau 2001; Moreau, Markman, and Lehmann 
(2001). Thus, we reason that consumers are likely to use features characteristic of a utility (e.g., 
no choice of provider, supplying an always available on-demand at home service, monthly 
billing cycles, etc.) as a lens to identify the most relevant similar providers, and draw on their 
experiences with such similar suppliers to inform what they may expect from their utility.  
Of the types of firms that most consumers have experiences with, we propose that Cable 
TV providers are likely to be more similar to utilities than suppliers from other categories and 
thereby both more salient and easier to learn from in consumers expectation formation. We 
tested this proposition by surveying a random sample of 170 U.S. consumers served by regulated 
monopoly power utilities, asking them to score a randomized list of different suppliers from 
other categories on their similarity with their electric utility with respect to how services are 
provided and how suppliers interact with them. As shown in Web Appendix A9, Cable TV 
providers were rated as the most similar firms to utilities, with a mean of over 6.5 (out of 10). 
This clearly suggests the salience of Cable TV providers as reference points for utility consumers 
in evaluating their supplier and supports the relevance of our proposed instrument.6  
                                                          
6 The criteria on which they are viewed as being similar to a utility also supports our logic (see Web Appendix A9). 
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Second, satisfying the exclusion restriction implies that the proposed instrument is not 
only correlated with the endogenous utility customer satisfaction variable but also that it does not 
correlate with the dependent variable of interest (utility firm profits and its components) 
(Wooldridge 2010). While customers utility expectations (and hence satisfaction) are likely to 
be influenced by their experiences with similar providers of other services such Cable TV, these 
experiences should not otherwise directly impact utility firms profitability. Furthermore, 
conversations with industry executives indicate that utility firms do not benchmark their 
satisfaction against any adjacent industries. Finally, customers Cable TV satisfaction is unlikely 
to be correlated with any of the potential omitted variables identified earlieri.e., individual 
utility firms current period profits, corporate culture, and management ability. Consequently, the 
proposed instrumental variable meets the exclusion condition.  
To measure the proposed instrument, for each Utility firm-year we construct a weighted 
(by customer share) average of customer satisfaction of Cable TV operators in the State(s) served 
by the Utility. For utilities serving more than one State, the average for each State was weighted 
by the proportion of the Utilitys revenue from each State (for details see Appendix 1). 
Empirically, we find that in line with our reasoning the proposed instrument is significantly 
correlated with utility satisfaction (-0.27, p < 0.001) but not with utility profitability (0.03, p = 
0.863). In addition, changes in satisfaction with Cable TV providers are likely to have a negative 
effect on consumers expectations from utility providers such that increases in satisfaction with 
the former raises expectations from the latter. As customer satisfaction is a function of consumer 
expectations, the higher expectations due to increases in customer satisfaction with Cable TV are 
likely to result in a negative effect on customer satisfaction with utilities. Empirically, we 
observe this phenomena and find that changes in cable TV satisfaction are significantly 
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correlated with changes in utility satisfaction (-0.54, p < 0.001). 
Furthermore, the cross-sectional variance in the proposed instrument is substantial and 
represents about 83% of the total variance in the instrument, alleviating granularity concerns 
(Angrist 2014). Additionally, as noted in the findings section, the first-stage R2 and Partial R2 F 
tests, the Anderson under identification LM statistic, and the Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic are 
all consistent with a strong and relevant instrument. Therefore, average satisfaction with local 
providers of Cable TV services provides a relevant, valid, and strong instrument and an 
appropriate identification strategy to address omitted variable bias, and establish causal direction 
in examining the relationship between utility firm satisfaction and profitability.7  
Finally, we checked for remaining estimation concerns including normality, presence of 
influential observations, and multicollinearity, and conclude that our data does not materially 
suffer from any of these shortcomings. The resulting estimates from our proposed model 
specifications are therefore unbiased and efficient. To test the association between customer 
satisfaction and profitability, we adopt the following base model specification: 
Profiti,t+1 = D0i + D1Satisfactioni,t + D2Ratesi,t + D3Firm Sizei,t + D4Diversificationi,t + (Eq.1A) 
+ D5Utility Type Indexi,t + D6Outage Indexi,t + 
+ 6D7-12.Demographic Controlsi,t + Year Dummiest+1 + Hi,t+1 
where i stands for firm and t for time (year), D0i is the time-invariant fixed effect that 
captures unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity in future profits (e.g., supplier and labor 
relations), and Hi,t+1 is the random error representing all unobserved influences on future 
profitability. We also include all controls described earlier. Lastly, we include a vector of 
mutually exclusive year dummies, to control for time-fixed effects. 
                                                          
7 Since causality bias and omitted variable bias are both forms of endogeneity bias, they share the same solution. 
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As described above, we address causality and omitted variable endogeneity using average 
satisfaction with local Cable TV services as an instrument for customer satisfaction (i.e., first-
stage estimates for the 2SLS FE-HAC second-stage model specification summarized in Eq.1A), 
using the following model specification: 
Satisfactioni,t = E0i + E1Cable TV Satisfactioni,t + E2Ratesi,t + (Eq.1B) 
+ E3Firm Sizei,t + E4Diversificationi,t + E5Utility Type Indexi,t + 
+ E6Outage Indexi,t + 6E7-12.Demographic Controlsi,t + Ki,t 
where all variables and subscripts are as noted earlier, E0i represents a fixed effect that 
captures firm-specific heterogeneity in satisfaction, and Cable TV Satisfaction is the average 
customer satisfaction score for providers serving each utilitys customers, weighted by their 
share of the customers in the State(s) served so it matches each utility firm coverage as closely as 
possible. Equations 1A and 1B are estimated simultaneously as a system, with Equation 1B (i.e., 
first-stage model) used to estimate ܵܽݐଓݏ݂ܽܿݐଓ݋݊ప,௧෣ , which is then used as the instrumental 
variable in Equation1A (i.e., second-stage model) for Satisfactioni,t. By construction, the 
proposed instrument is uncorrelated with the error term İi,t+1. Table 2 summarizes the first and 
second stage estimates for the proposed base model specification.  
Next, we follow an identical approach to estimate the effect of utility customer 
satisfaction on profits, and its two primary componentsrevenues and costs. As noted earlier, 
because revenues and costs are hard-wired, to address simultaneity concerns, we jointly estimate 
revenues and costs as a system of equations, while allowing the error term on each equation to 
covary. Both equations are estimated using fixed-effects heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
consistent standard errors (FE-HAC) and include identical controls to those used for the profit 
equation. We employ the same identification strategy used for the profit equation, and instrument 
utility firm customer satisfaction using average satisfaction with local providers of Cable TV 
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services, to estimate the following system of equations: 
Revenuesi,t+1 = D0i + D1Satisfactioni,t + D2Ratesi,t + D3Firm Sizei,t + (Eq.2A) 
+ D4Diversificationi,t + D5Utility Type Indexi,t + D6Outage Indexi,t +  
+ 6D7-12.Demographic Controlsi,t + 
+ Year Dummiest+1 + Hi,t+1 
Costsi,t+1 = E0i + E1Satisfactioni,t + E2Ratesi,t + E3Firm Sizei,t + (Eq.2B) 
+ E4Diversificationi,t + E5Utility Type Indexi,t + E6Outage Indexi,t +  
+ 6E7-12.Demographic Controlsi,t + 
+ Year Dummiest+1 + Ii,t+1 
where all variables and notation are as described above, and D0i and E0i are the time-
invariant unobservable firm-fixed effects, and Hi,t+1 and Ii,t+1 are random errors representing all 
unobserved influences on future revenues and costs, respectively, and are allowed to covary. 
Table 2 summarizes the estimates for the revenues and costs equations. 
Finally, in order to test the association between customer satisfaction and utility operating 
costs we utilize an identical FE-HAC standard errors estimation, while decomposing utility 
profits into its most granular components: Revenues (i.e., unit sales volume and rates), and Costs 
(i.e., SVOC and all other costs), using the variables Unit Salesi,t+1, Ratesi,t+1, SVOCi,t+1 and Other 
Costsi,t+1, respectively, as dependent variables. Similar to the previous analyses, we allow the 
error terms in all equations to covary to address simultaneity concerns and use average 
satisfaction with local providers of Cable TV services to instrument utility firms customer 
satisfaction. The proposed system of equations estimated is summarized below8: 
Dependent(k)i,t+1 = D(k)0i + D(k)1Satisfactioni,t + D(k)2Firm Sizei,t + D(k)3Diversificationi,t   (Eq.3k) 
+ D(k)4Utility Type Indexi,t + D(k)5Outage Indexi,t +  
                                                          
8 Since rates is the dependent variable in the second equation, it needs to be excluded as a regressor from each 
equation in the system of equations, including the first-stage equation. Subsequent estimation of the Unit Sales, 
SVOC and Other Costs equations, including rates as a regressor, yield findings identical to those reported in Table 3. 
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+ 6D(k)6-11.Demographic Controlsi,t + 
+ Year Dummies(k)t+1 + H(k)i,t+1 
where all variables and notation are as described above, and the Dependent(k) variable is 
in turn Unit Salesi,t+1, Ratesi,t+1, SVOCi,t+1 and Other Costsi,t+1, and the (k) subscript identifies 
estimates specific to each equation. Table 3 summarizes estimates for these granular analyses. 
[INSERT TABLES 2 & 3 HERE] 
FINDINGS 
Tables 2, 3 and 4 summarize the main empirical model testing results. Table 2 summarizes the 
overall effect of satisfaction on utility firm profitability using average cable TV satisfaction as an 
instrumental variable for utility satisfaction. Table 2 Eq. 1B first stage estimates support our 
identification strategy as average local cable TV provider customer satisfaction predicts utility 
satisfaction and is a strong and valid instrument, allowing us to demonstrate and estimate the 
causal relationship between customer satisfaction and utility firm profits. Specifically, the first 
stage R2 is 38.78% and the F statistic (F = 177.23, p < 0.001) is significant and larger than the 
average effective cut-off of 10 (Andrews, Stock, and Sun 2019). Additionally, the Anderson 
under-LGHQWLILFDWLRQ/0WHVWȤ2 = 25.68, p < 0.001), and the Cragg-'RQDOG:DOGWHVWȤ2 = 
28.31, p < 0.001 vs. Stock Yogo 10% Critical F Value = 16.38) confirm instrument strength. 
Additionally, the second stage R2 is 79.05% and the Wald test (F2 = 453.89, p < 0.001) confirm 
the overall goodness of fit of the model. The estimated model reveals that the effect of customer 
VDWLVIDFWLRQRQXWLOLW\ILUPSURILWLVSRVLWLYHDQGVLJQLILFDQWȕ p < 0.05). 
In terms of the mechanism by which customer satisfaction may be linked with utility firm 
profits, Table 2 confirms the expectation that in a regulated utility context customer satisfaction 
KDVQRLPSDFWRQXWLOLW\ILUPV¶IXWXUHUHYHQXHVȕ S!0) but does negatively predict 
IXWXUHFRVWVȕ -32.35, p < 0.01). Table 3 shows more granular results decomposing utility firm 
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revenues into unit sales and rates and firm costs into operating costs likely to be affected by 
customer satisfaction vs. other costs as separate dependent variables. As expected, Table 3 
reveals an insignificant relationship between current period satisfaction and following period unit 
VDOHVȕ S!,QOLQHZLWKUHJXODWRU\SROLF\ZHDOVRILQGWKDWFXUUHQWSHULRG
FXVWRPHUVDWLVIDFWLRQKDVQRVLJQLILFDQWHIIHFWRQIXWXUHSHULRGUDWHVȕ S!
Additionally, the insignificant coefficient for current customer satisfaction on future other 
FRVWVȕ -S!VXSSRUWVRXUDUJXPHQWVUHJDUGLQJWKHW\SHVRIFRVWVWKDWPD\EH
unlikely to be affected by satisfaction. However, Table 3 reveals that the effect of a utility firms 
cXUUHQWFXVWRPHUVDWLVIDFWLRQRQLWVIXWXUHRSHUDWLQJFRVWV692&LVQHJDWLYHDQGVLJQLILFDQWȕ
= -28.93, p < 0.001), providing additional support for our conceptual arguments.  
Overall, the empirical analyses reveal a strong preponderance of evidence supporting the 
conceptual model proposition that customer satisfaction predicts future utility firm profits, and 
does so not by allowing higher rates, affecting unit demand, or lowering other costs, but by 
reducing utilities operating cost to serve customers. Thus, our results show that the only path 
through which customer satisfaction affects future profits in the utility industry is via lowering 
operating costs. Since satisfying customers is not costless, our results indicate that for utilities the 
increased efficiency benefits of customer satisfaction outweigh the costs of providing it.  
To provide additional insight into some of the underlying routes by which satisfaction 
may lead to lower operating costs, we examined supplementary data for the utility firms in our 
sample. The rationale proposed earlier suggests that customer satisfaction reduces operating 
costs and enhances employee productivity via lowering customer complaints and service calls 
and enhancing customer trust and goodwill. To provide insight on some of these potential 
mechanisms, we first obtained customer complaint data for a subset of 30 firms for 3 years, 
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yielding 90 firm-year observations. In this sub-sample, we find a correlation of -0.30 (p < 0.05) 
between customer satisfaction and complaints, and a correlation of 0.18 (p < 0.09) between 
complaints and these firms SVOCboth consistent with this aspect of the proposed satisfaction 
cost-reduction mechanism. Second, we assessed enhanced employee productivity as a 
mechanism on all 478 firm-year observations, using a stochastic frontier estimation approach 
(with number of employees as the input and total units of gas/electricity generated as the output) 
to calibrate employee productivity. These analyses are also consistent with our rationale, 
revealing that customer satisfaction is a significant positive predictor of utility employee 
productivity ȕ S. See Appendix 2 for additional details. 
To understand which specific operating costs are reduced by enhanced customer 
satisfaction we also decomposed the operating costs (SVOC) variable into its five components 
and examined the relationship between satisfaction and each of these costs, using an 
identification strategy identical to that described earlier. These analyses are summarized in Table 
4, and reveal that while the effect of satisfaction is negative for all five operating cost types, it is 
RQO\VWDWLVWLFDOO\VLJQLILFDQWIRUWKUHHRIWKHVHFRVWVGLVWULEXWLRQFRVWVȕ -7.89, p < 0.001), 
VDOHVDQGJHQHUDOH[SHQVHVȕ -SDQGFXVWRPHUVHUYLFHFRVWVȕ -30.19, p < 
0.001). The absence of a significant effect of satisfaction on the costs of full-time employee 
salaries9 suggests that the productivity gains detailed in Appendix 2 may be the result of 
enhanced employee engagement and freeing up customer-facing employees to engage in 
productive tasks that may otherwise not be undertaken, rather than lower full-time employee 
numbers. The reduced distribution costs and sales and general expenses associated with higher 
satisfaction are consistent with the earlier arguments linking customer satisfaction with greater 
                                                          
9 Part-time employee costs are counted by EIA as part of Sales and General Expenses, with which we observe a 
significant negative relationship with satisfactionbut the part-time employee cost item is not separately reported. 
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trust and cooperation from customers. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 & APPENDIX 2 HERE] 
Robustness Checks and Generalizability Assessment 
To further establish the robustness of our empirical results, we conducted three additional 
analyses. First, we rule out the possibility that our results are significantly affected by differences 
across state-level regulatory regimes. This is a potential concern since the customer satisfaction 
data in our sample is aggregated to the firm-level, but some utility firms operate across states and 
therefore can face multiple regulating authorities. Statistically, any such biases or inefficiencies 
in our analyses should be minimized by the inclusion of firm and year fixed effects in the 
estimated models. However, to fully rule out such any such effects, we re-estimated the models 
summarized in Tables 3 and 4 using State-level data from J.D. Power, covering 76 utilities for 
the period 2012-2017, for a total of 449 firm-year observations. As shown in Appendix 3, the 
estimates replicate the original findings on the effect of satisfaction on utility firm profits, and 
provide additional evidence substantiating reduced operating costs as the primary mechanism for 
the observed relationship. 
Second, we rule out the possibility that the effects observed are driven by utility firms 
previous investments in customer satisfaction. Our executive interviews and industry reports 
suggest that the three most important drivers of utility customers satisfaction are outages, prices, 
and customer service (e.g., McNamara and Winter 2013; Sullivan et al. 1996). Utility firms may 
choose to invest in each of these major satisfaction drivers in order to maintain or enhance their 
performance. Being unable to secure data on the investment costs associated with improving 
each of these major drivers of their customers satisfactionand given that such investments 
take some time to pay offwe explored the satisfaction-profit relationship using longer time 
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period measures of satisfaction and profits, revealing a more precise effect of satisfaction on 
profits, net of such investments costs (amortization) and cumulative effect on satisfaction. 
Discussions with executives suggested that the longest reasonable lag between making such 
investments and observing customer satisfaction results was three years. We therefore re-
estimated our empirical models using (i) 3-year average satisfaction and profits; and (ii) 
weighted average (using 25%, 50% and 25% as weights for prior, current, and future year, 
respectively) satisfaction and profits, using average local Cable TV provider satisfaction to 
instrument the alternative measures of customer satisfaction. We found that the substantive 
results remain the same (see Web Appendix Table A1 for details). 
Third, while random treatment is the gold-standard to establish causality, no utility firm 
is likely to allow researchers to manipulate their customers satisfaction. A next-best approach to 
demonstrate causality is to identify and leverage a natural or quasi-natural experiment that 
exogenously impacts utility customer satisfaction. Following this logic, if higher customer 
satisfaction causes higher utility firm profits by reducing operating costs, then any exogenously 
determined customer satisfaction should also impact the utility firms profits and operating costs. 
From this perspective, it is well-known in the utility industry that some of the variation in 
customer satisfaction is unrelated to the utilitys efforts in delivering quality and efficiency and is 
instead determined by the demographic make-up of the firms served customer base (Zarakas, 
Hanser, and Diep 2013). This is consistent with prior research in other industry contexts (e.g., 
Mittal and Kamakura 2001). Thus, some proportion of a utilitys customer satisfaction is 
exogenous and cannot be controlled by the firm. Following the logic of our causal rationale, such 
exogenously determined satisfaction should also predict utility firm profits and operating costs. 
We examine the effect of this exogenously determined satisfaction on utility firm profits 
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and operating costs using U.S. Census demographic data to calibrate the exogenous demographic 
make-up of each utility firms geographic service area (i.e., served customer base). Specifically, 
we regress satisfaction on five key demographic variables (income, education, gender, age and 
race), to estimate the customer satisfaction attributable to the demographic make-up of each 
utilitys served customer base and control for year-fixed effects. By construction, this measure is 
exogenous to all other variables in our empirical analyses. Next, we re-estimated the firm profits 
and SVOC model specifications, replacing the original customer satisfaction variablesimilar to 
the 2SLS FE-HAC approach described earlierwith the exogenous demographic-predicted 
satisfaction. As shown in Appendix 4, we find that although the effect sizes are smaller than 
those estimated in previous analyses, the effect of this exogenously determined satisfaction on 
profits remains positive and significant ȕ 90, p < 0.001), and on operating costs remains 
negative and significant ȕ -9.01, p < 0.01). Since, this exogenously determined customer 
satisfaction cannot be explained by any firm-related unobserved variable (e.g., management 
quality, prior investments in technology and equipment that may drive satisfaction, costs, and 
profits) or by any of the observed variables included in our empirical analyses, and because it 
temporally precedes the utility firms observed profits and operating costs, it provides strong 
evidence for the proposed causal satisfaction-cost-profit relationship. 
[INSERT APPENDIX 3 & 4 HERE] 
We also conducted sensitivity analyses on our results (see Web Appendix Tables A2 
through A5). First, we used ROA in place of profit as an alternate accounting performance 
measure and results remain essentially identical. Second, we substituted utility firms total 
operating costs (i.e., SVOC) with the average operating costs per residential customer as the 
dependent variable and results remain consistent. We also computed and used the average cost-
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to-serve all customers using the total combined number of residential, commercial, and industrial 
customers as the dependent variable and results remained substantively unchanged. Third, to 
address any concern of potentially biased parameter estimates from a complete case analysis 
(and to benefit from increased power) we also created an imputed dataset (estimating the values 
of missing variables) using the multivariate normal model (Little and Rubin 1987). This 
expanded our data set to a balanced panel of 45 utilities and 582 firm-year observations. We 
found the substantive results to be unchanged when estimated on the larger imputed dataset.  
Having established the robustness of our estimates, we used a post-hoc test to examine 
the generalizability of our findings. As noted earlier, our sampling framework includes only 
utility firms operating in No Choice States (i.e., regulated monopolies where each customer 
has only one utility provider in their geographic service area). In our post-hoc analyses, we also 
include utility firms operating in Choice StatesU.S. states which have adopted programs that 
allow consumers to buy from competing retail power suppliers. The augmented sampling 
framework includes an additional 7 utility firms (for a total of 104 firm-year observations), 
which we use to estimate differences in the proposed satisfaction-profit effect size, via a dummy 
indicator that distinguishes between No Choice and Choice States (i.e., dummy indicator, and 
interaction between satisfaction and the dummy indicator). Our substantive results remain 
unchanged and we find the interaction coefficient to be non-VLJQLILFDQWȕ 1.02, p !
indicating that the effect of satisfaction on utility firms profits is positive, significant, and 
invariant across No Choice and Choice States. Thus, our results are robust to including Choice 
State utility firms, which is to be expected, since operating coststhe mechanism linking 
customer satisfaction with profitsare likely to be relatively unaffected by competition. 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
In a sample of U.S. public utilities over a long time series our analyses reveal a significant and 
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robust positive relationship between customer satisfaction and firm profits. Consistent with our 
expectations given the characteristics of the utility industry, our results confirm that satisfaction 
does not impact utility profits via either rates (prices per unit) or demand (unit sales volume) but 
provide unambiguous evidence that it does so by reducing utility operating costs. Subsequent 
analyses of operating cost components and utility complaint and productivity data provide 
evidence consistent with this efficiency-enhancing benefit of satisfaction being a result of cost 
savings and employee benefits from dealing with fewer unhappy customers, and greater 
customer cooperation from enhanced customer goodwill toward and trust in the firm.  
Overall, this research contributes to theory in two main ways. First, our findings extend 
the scope of MBA theory. To-date MBA theory has not considered regulated market settings
which is also true of the broader customer satisfaction literature. Indeed prior research either 
assumes that customer satisfaction does not matter in such markets (e.g., Jacobson and Mizik 
2009) or excludes them as being too idiosyncratic (e.g., Anderson, Fornell, and Mazvancheryl 
2004; Morgan and Rego 2006). We provide evidence that MBA theory can be usefully extended 
to non-competitive settings. Thus, to the extent that satisfaction is an indicator of a firms 
customer relationships, we show that this can be a valuable asset even when customers 
behavioral loyalty is practically guaranteed. This opens up a theoretically and managerially 
interesting set of economically important and often high customer-dependency industries to 
which application of MBA theory can be extended. In addition, the cause of the satisfaction-
profit relationship we uncoverreducing the firms operating costsis not one that has been 
conceptually well-developed, and has received little empirically attention. Our results suggest 
that the largely unexplored efficiency-enhancing benefits of MBAs may be considerable. 
Second, we contribute to regulatory economics theory which presumes a misalignment of 
32 
natural monopoly firm incentives with the interest of their customers leading to such markets 
being regulated via price-setting, quality standards, and efficiency improvement controls (e.g., 
Bös 2014; Raith 2003). Our results indicate that as currently regulated via such controls there is 
still a cost-based incentive for public utilities to deliver and improve their customers 
satisfaction. This contributes to regulatory economics theory by identifying an important new 
mechanismcustomer satisfaction reducing utility firm operating costs and thereby enhancing 
their profitsby which incentives between natural monopolies and their customers are aligned 
even in the absence of competition. This study also offers strong evidence that current regulatory 
economic theory assumptions that providing higher service quality raises utility system costs are 
incorrect, which may change the economic models on which controls selected by regulatory 
system designers are based (e.g., Perez-Arriaga, Jenkins, and Battle 2017; Tirole 2015). 
This research also offers new insights for managers, policy-makers, and regulators. From 
a managerial perspective, utility managers are uncertain as to whether they should be investing in 
satisfying their customers, and if so, what the returns may be. Our study clearly indicates that if 
they are not doing so already, utility managers need to track their customers satisfaction. They 
should also set targets for customer satisfaction improvement and invest in strategies designed to 
accomplish this goal. Our results suggest that doing so will lead to efficiency improvements as a 
result of lower customer service, distribution, and selling and general administrative costs and 
ultimately to enhanced profitability. For the average utility in our sample, a one unit (on the 1-
100 point ACSI scale) improvement in customer satisfaction may be expected to reduce  
operating costs by $29 million overall, with contributions of customer service, distribution, and 
selling and general administrative costs to lowered costs of $3, $8, and $13 million per year, 
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respectively.10 Given the need for utility firms to reach regulator mandated efficiency goals and 
the costs and penalties of failing to do so (Makholm 2018), these benefits from customer 
satisfaction investments should also be calibrated. This will help utility managers budget for 
investments in customer satisfaction improvement appropriately. 
The efficiency gains available from enhancing satisfaction via greater customer trust and 
goodwill leading to greater acceptance of new technologies introduced by utilities suggested by 
our results also provides a timely insight for managers. Utilities are currently working on 
numerous efficiency-enhancing technology initiatives that will require consumer help to 
introduce and leverage including: advanced meters that allow use of differential rates; smart 
grids allowing better load balancing; and net metering allowing consumers to contribute energy 
and storage to the grid (MacGill and Smith 2017). If greater customer satisfaction enhances both 
consumer willingness to allow utilities to introduce such technologies and subsequent consumer 
use of them, then utility satisfaction improvement programs should be managed and aligned with 
their technology initiatives as well as their efficiency programs. 
This study also has implications for policy-makers and regulators. The results indicate 
thatat least as currently regulatedgreater satisfaction of utility customers not only ensures 
consumer welfare by improving utility provider efficiency but also increases the future 
profitability of the utility. This suggests that incentives between utilities and their customers are 
aligned in U.S. regulated public utility markets. It is also important to policy-makers charged 
with protecting consumers that we confirm that increasing customer satisfaction does not 
enhance the firms ability to persuade regulators to raise prices or customers to increase demand. 
For policy-makers these are clearly important findings for those they regulate (utilities), those 
                                                          
10 While the samples are different and contain different firm sizes with varying cost breakdowns, this overall dollar 
amount is comparable to that reported by Lim et al. (2020) with respect to average cost of convenience savings. 
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they seek to protect (consumers), and those they answer to (legislators).  
For regulators, information asymmetry and the cost/availability of data used in regulation 
are key considerations in regulatory system design (Tirole 2015). Ideal incentives drive utilities 
to behave in ways that benefit customers without raising costs (Makholm 2018; Tirole 2015). 
Our results show that customer satisfactionwhich by definition benefits customersalso 
allows utilities to reduce costs and enhance efficiency. It is also relatively cheap for utilities to 
measure. This suggests regulators should both allow investments in customer satisfaction to be 
recoverable and add customer satisfaction to the mix of regulatory controls applied and require 
the collection and reporting of satisfaction data. Satisfaction measurement and reporting can 
easily be standardized (using exemplars such as the ACSI), which will aid benchmarking across 
utilities. This may also help regulators in their moves towards performance-based regulation 
where satisfaction may capture drivers of service quality that are not captured in currently used 
objective driver measures (e.g., service uptime and interruptions).  
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
A number of limitations should be kept in mind when considering the results of this study, which 
also present opportunities for future research. First, ACSI surveys measure the satisfaction of 
consumers but not business customers, thus we could not explore the effects of the satisfaction of 
utility business customers. Subsequent robustness tests in which we included operating cost to 
serve business customers as an additional control in our analyses did not change our results. 
Furthermore, utility firm profits from residential customers is extremely highly correlated with 
their overall profits (0.96) in our data, suggesting that the managerial implications of our study 
hold for utility firms. However, whether and how business customer satisfaction and firm profits 
and operating costs may be connected remains an interesting area for future research.  
Second, with detailed and verified cost-data, the utility industry provides a unique context 
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to allow the exploration of the efficiency-enhancing effect of customer satisfaction. We find 
similar effects when Choice State utilities are included in our generalization testing, and Lim et 
al.s (2020) recent findings suggest that these effects generalize within the ACSI sectors. Our 
results suggest that the efficiency-enhancing benefits of customer satisfaction may arise via 
reduced customer complaints and employee productivity gains, and enhanced customer trust and 
goodwill while Lim et al. (2020) identify reduced costs of selling in competitive markets. 
Clearly, further research is required to more directly examine each of these efficiency-enhancing 
mechanisms. It is also likely that there are boundary conditions to each mechanism and 
potentially even trade-offs between them. For example, when customization is an important 
determinant of perceived quality, does enhancing customer satisfaction reduce rather than 
improve productivity even if it reduces complaints? Similarly, in high touch contexts where 
customer service requirements are high, do the increased costs of providing satisfaction outweigh 
the lower costs of dealing with unhappy customers? Exploring such boundary conditions would 
provide new insights for managers considering strategies for improving customer satisfaction. 
In addition, this study also identifies important new avenues for future research. First, this 
research reveals the efficiency-enhancing benefit of customer satisfaction as the driver of the 
relationship between satisfaction and utility firms profits. This supports Lim et al.s (2020) 
recent findings in competitive consumer markets. How economically significant are such 
efficiency benefits relative to revenue-enhancing benefits under different levels of competition? 
Do efficiency-enhancing benefits also exist for other MBAs such as brands? Answering these 
questions may enable managers to more fully account for all of the economic benefits of MBAs 
to the firm, reducing the likelihood of firm under-investment. 
Second, regulatory economics and policy approaches to consumer welfare in natural 
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monopolies focus on price and objective quality. Our results reveal a utility firm-customer 
interest alignment via customer satisfaction that does not operate through quality (outages) or 
prices (rates) in regulated public utility markets. How might insights and resulting policy change 
in other areas if consumer welfare is examined with a focus on subjective customer satisfaction 
outcomes in addition to price and objective quality? For example, since regulatory mechanisms 
in uncompetitive markets are costly for governments and firms, could regulatory regimes be 
lighter (and cheaper) if customer satisfaction were added to the consumer welfare indicators used 
and could this lead to lower costs and prices without reducing quality? 
CONCLUSION 
Researchers studying customer satisfactions impact on firm performance have focused almost 
exclusively on competitive markets, implicitlyand sometime explicitlyassuming that it is 
irrelevant in non-competitive markets. Our study of the U.S. utility industry shows that customer 
satisfaction is a valuable asset even in a regulated monopolistic market. Results revealing 
customer satisfactions role in driving firm profits by reducing operating costs also highlight the 
largely neglected efficiency-enhancing benefit of satisfaction in such markets. Post-hoc analyses 
are consistent with this efficiency-enhancing effect arising from reducing customer complaints 
and increasing customer trust and goodwill in ways that lower costs to serve customers and 
enhance employee productivity. In addition to the new insights provided into where and how 
satisfaction contributes to firm performance, these results have important implications for utility 
managers, regulatory economic theory, and regulators.
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FIGURE 1 
CUSTOMER SATISFACTION PATHWAYS TO UTILITY FIRM PROFITS 
 
 
 
Note: Solid arrows from customer satisfaction indicate likely relationships, dotted arrows indicate less likely possible relationships in a utility context, but all routes to 
profitability are empirically examined. 
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TABLE 1 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONS (N=478) 
VARIABLE MEAN SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1. Customer Satisfaction(t) 73.54 4.84 1.000                  
2. Net Profit(t) 710.67 933.32 .075 1.000                 
3. Net Profit(t+1) 788.28 930.90 .120 .708 1.000                
4. Sales Revenue(t) 5030.10 865.11 .048 .379 .249 1.000               
5. Unit Sales Volume(t) 39.39 57.13 .017 .664 .300 .897 1.000              
6. SVOC(t) 1206.70 685.50 -.144 .149 .124 .399 .498 1.000             
7. Other Costs(t) 3501.60 1149.71 .113 .255 .157 .439 .335 .647 1.000            
8. Diversification(t) 10.97 13.38 .181 -.027 -.020 -.092 -.101 -.309 -.330 1.000           
9. Rates(t) 11.09 3.79 .093 .340 .309 .160 .018 .065 .029 -.138 1.000          
10. Firm Size(t) 27414.14 14583.10 .129 .422 .352 .018 .075 .605 .639 -.189 .046 1.000         
11. Outage Index(t)  2713.11 6459.98 -.122 .189 .178 .010 .010 .243 .160 -.017 -.067 .183 1.000        
12. Utility Type Index(t) 0.17 0.38 .019 .029 .027 .190 .168 -.269 -.361 .029 -.617 -.029 -.044 1.000       
13. % Caucasian(t) 75.37 9.59 .134 -.049 -.041 -.079 -.030 -.010 -.020 -.019 .018 -.022 -.025 -.004 1.000      
14. % African American(t) 13.13 7.07 -.015 .004 -.001 .038 -.240 -.222 .015 .184 -.092 .044 .239 -.012 -.512 1.000     
15. Income(t) 44908.46 6141.13 -.063 .229 .280 .228 .199 .341 .380 .015 .099 .382 .182 -.008 -.120 -.181 1.000    
16. Education(t) 25.84 5.01 -.237 .158 .147 .109 .190 .030 .222 .049 -.120 .209 .201 -.003 -.461 -.118 .630 1.000   
17. Gender(t) 48.88 0.59 -.105 .029 .029 .019 .048 .052 .026 .012 .030 .029 .002 .004 -.080 -.450 .291 -.097 1.000  
18. Age(t) 35.59 2.38 .125 .205 .209 .159 -.131 -.301 .189 -.089 .157 .180 .071 .007 .090 .060 .409 .190 -.028 1.000 
Note: Correlation coefficients larger than |.118| are significant at the p<0.01 level, while those greater than |.090| are significant at the p<0.05 level. 
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TABLE 2 
EFFECT OF CUSTOMER SATISFACTION ON UTILITY FIRM PROFIT, REVENUES AND COSTS 
LOCAL CABLE TV PROVIDERS SATISFACTION AS INSTRUMENT FOR UTILITY SATISFACTION 
UNSTANDARDIZED 
ESTIMATES 
Eq.1A 
Profit(t+1) 
(Second Stage) 
Eq.1B 
Utility Satisfaction(t) 
(First Stage) 
Eq.2A 
Revenues(t+1) 
(Second Stage) 
Eq.2B 
Costs(t+1) 
(Second Stage) 
MAIN EFFECTS     ܵܽݐଓݏ݂ܽܿݐଓ݋݊(௧)෣  116.04*  70.21 -32.35** 
 (45.22)  (102.11) (12.49) 
Cable TV Satisfaction(t)  -0.21
*
   
  (0.09)   
     
CONTROLS     
Rates(t) 81.22
* -0.12* 5.32* -5.07 
 (32.04) (0.06) (2.33) (2.85) 
Firm Size(t) 0.05
*** 0.19 0.43*** 0.31*** 
 (0.01) (0.16) (0.04) (0.08) 
Diversification(t) 13.10 0.08
*** 12.63** -4.01 
 (5.18) (0.02) (4.87) (3.39) 
Utility Type Index(t) -8.01
** 0.62 2.54 -5.90*** 
 (2.77) (0.51) (2.97) (1.39) 
Outage Index(t) -0.01 -0.04
*** -0.16 0.34 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.010) (0.56) 
% Caucasian(t) 0.07 0.78* 0.80 -0.35 
 (0.11) (0.39) (0.51) (0.40) 
% African American(t) 0.17 -0.63
*** 0.75 -0.70 
 (0.13) (0.12) (0.55) (0.52) 
Income(t) -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
Education(t) 2.14 0.26
*** 9.95 0.26 
 (2.69) (0.06) (11.12) (0.43) 
Gender(t) 0.47
** 0.19 0.25 -0.14 
 (0.15) (0.17) (0.54) (0.19) 
Age(t) 29.66 0.23
** 20.09 -10.81 
 (35.33) (0.07) (18.91) (15.04) 
     
TESTS     
First Stage     
Shea Partial R2  7.63%   
Adjusted R2  38.78%   
F(12,489)  177.23
***   
Anderson LM statistic  25.68***   
Cragg-Donald Wald F(1,489)  28.31
***   
Stock Yogo Critical F  10% 16.38 
20%  6.86 
25% 5.79 
  
Second Stage     
Wald F2 453.89***  Likelihood Ratio F2 
Pseudo-R2 79.05%  490.40*** 
     
Notes: *** significant at p<0.001; ** significant at p<0.01; * significant at p<0.05. Standard errors in parentheses. Simultaneous 
estimation of equations 1A and 1B, and equations 2A, 2B and 1B via two-stage least square (2SLS) with fixed-effects and 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (FE-HAC) standard errors. Year dummies included. 
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TABLE 3 
EFFECT OF CUSTOMER SATISFACTION ON UTILITY REVENUES AND COSTS COMPONENTS 
LOCAL CABLE TV PROVIDERS SATISFACTION AS INSTRUMENT FOR UTILITY SATISFACTION 
UNSTANDARDIZED 
ESTIMATES  
REVENUES COSTS 
Eq.3A 
Unit Sales(t+1) 
Eq.3B 
Rates(t+1) 
Eq.3C 
SVOC(t+1) 
Eq.3D 
Other Costs(t+1) 
MAIN EFFECTS     ܵܽݐଓݏ݂ܽܿݐଓ݋݊(௧)෣  37.76 5.71 -28.93*** -0.20 
 (47.31) (3.14) (5.33) (0.16) 
     
CONTROLS     
Firm Size(t) 0.02
*** 0.02** 0.03*** 0.05*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Diversification(t) -0.13 0.05 -0.48 0.03 
 (0.19) (0.03) (0.83) (0.03) 
Utility Type Index(t) -0.01 0.03 1.01 -1.92 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.60) (1.10) 
Outage Index(t) -0.01
** 0.01 0.01* 0.02 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) 
% Caucasian(t) 0.19 0.13 -0.26 0.50 
 (0.17) (0.09) (0.31) (0.31) 
% African American(t) 0.52 0.03 -0.26 0.10 
 (0.41) (0.02) (0.30) (0.12) 
Income(t) -0.01 0.09 -0.06
*** -0.01** 
 (0.01) (0.07) (0.01) (0.00) 
Education(t) -0.89 0.03 -7.20
** -4.32*** 
 (0.54) (0.03) (2.21) (1.03) 
Gender(t) 5.77 0.11 -0.07 0.87 
 (7.53) (0.09) (0.06) (0.80) 
Age(t) 2.01
** -0.04 -20.28 7.19 
 (0.76) (0.03) (22.10) (9.54) 
     
TESTS     
Likelihood Ratio F2 523.65***    
     
Notes: *** significant at p<0.001; ** significant at p<0.01; * significant at p<0.05. Standard errors in parentheses. Simultaneous 
estimation of equations 3A, 3B, 3C, 3D and 1B (not shown and excluding Rates(t)) via 2SLS with fixed-effects and 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (FE-HAC) standard errors. Year dummies included. 
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TABLE 4 
EFFECTS OF CUSTOMER SATISFACTION ON UTILITY OPERATING COSTS COMPONENTS 
LOCAL CABLE TV PROVIDERS SATISFACTION AS INSTRUMENT FOR UTILITY SATISFACTION 
UNSTANDARDIZED 
ESTIMATES 
SATISFACTION VARYING OPERATING COST 
Eq.4A 
Distribution(t+1) 
Eq.4B 
SGE(t+1) 
Eq.4C 
Bad Debt(t+1) 
Eq.4D 
Salary(t+1) 
Eq.4E 
Cust.Service(t+1) 
MAIN EFFECTS      ܵܽݐଓݏ݂ܽܿݐଓ݋݊(௧)෣  -7.89*** -13.54** -2.26 -37.38 -30.19*** 
 (1.13) (4.90) (8.13) (50.19) (2.56) 
      
CONTROLS      
 Firm Size(t) 0.01
** 0.01*** 0.01* 0.01** 0.01** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 Diversification(t) -1.32
*** -1.06*** -0.09 -7.89** -0.94*** 
 (0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (2.52) (0.20) 
Utility Type Index(t) 2.54 -2.11 -0.07
* -4.00 -3.04 
 (4.20) (4.39) (0.03) (3.43) (6.09) 
 Outage Index(t) 0.01
** 0.01 0.01** 0.01** 0.01 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
% Caucasian(t) -1.40
** -0.73** -0.20*** -11.88** -0.57** 
 (0.51) (0.24) (0.03) (3.72) (0.20) 
% African American(t) -1.64
* -1.17** -0.03 -9.31*** -2.40** 
 (0.78) (0.38) (0.02) (2.06) (0.87) 
Income(t) 0.01
** 0.01 -0.01*** 0.02 -0.01 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) 
Education(t) 4.09
*** 2.30*** -0.23*** 11.20 -0.79 
 (0.89) (0.48) (0.05) (9.98) (1.02) 
Gender(t) -0.08
*** -0.04 -0.09 -0.06 -0.10 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.10) (0.10) (0.07) 
Age(t) -2.81 -1.29 -0.41
* -1.42 -3.25* 
 (1.71) (0.98) (0.19) (1.31) (1.55) 
      
TESTS      
Likelihood Ratio Ȥ2 1,210.98***     
         
Notes: *** significant at p<0.001; ** significant at p<0.01; * significant at p<0.05. Standard errors in parentheses. Simultaneous 
estimation of equations 4A, 4B, 4C, 4D, 4E and 1B (not shown and excluding Rates(t)) via 2SLS with fixed-effects and 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (FE-HAC) standard errors. Year dummies included. 
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APPENDIX 1 
VARIABLES AND MEASUREMENT DETAILS 
MAIN VARIABLES SOURCE/LITERATURE 
Utility Customer Satisfaction Firm-level latent variable capturing customers cumulative satisfaction with their product/service 
consumption experience from an annual national representative sample of 65,000+ consumers, from 200+ U.S. firms. 
ACSI 
Fornell et al. (1996) 
Profit Net operating income from the utilitys regulated business for residential accounts only, measured as the difference between 
net operating revenue (item UOPEREUCO for electricity firms and UOPRGWR for gas firms) and net operating expense (item 
UOPEXE for electric firms and UOPEXGW for gas firms). 
EIA 
 
Satisfaction Varying Operating Costs (SVOC) Total of utility firm's reported total operating expenses incurred in serving residential 
customer accounts related to (a) Distribution Expenses (b) Customer Service (c) Bad Debt (d) Employee Salaries, and (e) Sales and 
General Expense Costs (Items UOPED, UOPECENC, USW, UOPECA and UOPEAG)  
SVOC per Customer Variable operating costs per residential customer was operationalized as the ratio of total variable operating 
costs (as above) to the number of residential customers served by the utility.  
EIA 
Turney and Stratton (1992) 
Other Costs Total of utility firm's reported total operating expenses incurred in serving residential customer accounts related to (a) 
Fuel Costs (b) Production Costs (c) Depreciation and (d) Maintenance (Items UFCOSTT, UEPPEXP, UXDPE and UMEE) 
EIA 
Unit Sales Volume (in MwH units) The utility firm's reported total unit sales in Mega Watt-hours (item USALEEUC for electricity 
suppliers) and in million Btu (item USALEGWUC for gas suppliers) for residential customers only. Btu was converted to MwH 
using the formula 1 Btu = 2.93X10-7 MwH to obtain equivalent units. 
EIA 
 
Sales Revenue (in $) The utility firm's reported total revenue from residential customer sales only (item UOPRER). EIA 
Rates Average annual rates (prices paid) per unit of power consumed by the utilitys residential customers, obtained from Form 826 
EIA Survey (item code UAVGAREB). 
EIA 
Local Cable TV Provider Customer Satisfaction Instrument Average satisfaction with all cable providers operating in the State(s) 
served by the utility using firm-level ACSI measures capturing customer satisfaction with Cable TV service providers, weighted by 
the Cable TV providers market penetration in the state(s) in which the utilitys customers reside computed as:  
Avg. cable TV satisfaction for State x = customer share of cable TV provider 1 * satisfaction of provider 1 + customer share of 
cable TV company 2 * satisfaction of provider 2 +  + customer share of cable TV company k * satisfaction of provider k + 
customer share of all other cable TV providers * satisfaction of all other providers. 
Where 1 through k represent the major cable TV providers operating in that State for a specific year, and all other cable TV providers 
is the ACSI All Others score (an aggregate of customers interviewed who are served by one of the large number of small cable 
TV providers within the industry) which captures the satisfaction of customers served by all smaller cable TV providers. 
ACSI and Broadcasting and 
Cable Yearbook. 
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APPENDIX 1 
VARIABLES AND MEASUREMENT DETAILS (CONTINUED) 
FIRM-LEVEL CONTROLS SOURCE/LITERATURE 
Outage Index A multiplied index consisting of the number of residential customers affected by outages per firm-per year as a control 
variable, the number of outages and the duration of time to service the outage and re-secure power supply all of which were 
obtained from form OE-417 reported by FERC. 
FERC 
Utility Type Index The percentage revenue that the firm earns from sales of electricity vs. gas EIA 
Diversification Percentage of the firms total revenue obtained from operations in other (unregulated) industries. The amount of 
revenue earned by a firm from operating in a segment with a different 4 digit SIC code was captured and the industry group was 
manually checked to ensure it is unregulated as well as not representing a supplementary operation but a substantially different one. 
This distinction is important since for example, for a gas supplier, sourcing and transmitting gas would be listed under separate 4 
digit SIC codes though they are central to the same service provision.  
COMPUSTAT Segments 
Johnson, Hoskisson, and Hitt 
(1993) 
Firm Size The firm's reported total assets (item AT).  COMPUSTAT Fundamentals  
CUSTOMER-LEVEL CONTROLS SOURCE/LITERATURE 
Demographic Controls State level demographic data on age, sex, household income, race, and education was obtained from the U.S. 
Census (U.S. Census Bureau 1990-2010). Since some of the utility firms in our sample operate in regions in multiple States, a 
weighted average of each demographic variable was used where the weights were assigned in proportion to the revenue earned by 
the firm in each State. For example, if firm A earned revenue amounts x and y from States X and Y respectively, each demographic 
from State X would be multiplied by the weight x / (x + y) and each demographic from State Y would be multiplied by the weight y/ 
(x + y) to generate the composite weighted demographic. The State-level revenue figures were obtained from COMPUSTAT 
Segments (State). 
US Census 
COMPUSTAT Segments 
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APPENDIX 2 
EFFECT OF CUSTOMER SATISFACTION ON UTILITY FIRM EMPLOYEE PRODUCTIVITY 
UNSTANDARDIZED 
ESTIMATES 
Productivity(t+1) 
MAIN EFFECTS  ܵܽݐଓݏ݂ܽܿݐଓ݋݊(௧)෣  1.61* 
 (0.77) 
  
CONTROLS  
Firm Size(t) 0.01
*** 
 (0.00) 
Diversification(t) 0.10 
 (0.21) 
Utility Type Index(t) 0.13 
 (0.18) 
Outage Index(t) -0.01 
 (0.01) 
  
TESTS  
Wald F2 1,158.30*** 
    
Notes: *** significant at p<0.001; ** significant at p<0.01; * significant at p<0.05. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Simultaneous estimation of Productivity and modified version of 1B equations (not shown) via 2SLS with fixed-
effects and heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (FE-HAC) standard errors. Demographics excluded 
for parsimony. Year dummies included. 
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APPENDIX 3 
EFFECT OF CUSTOMER SATISFACTION ON UTILITY PROFIT COMPONENTS  
STATE-LEVEL J.D. POWER DATA 
UNSTANDARDIZED 
ESTIMATES  
PROFITS, REVENUES AND COSTS 
Profits(t+1) Unit Sales (t+1) Rates(t+1) SVOC(t+1) Other Costs(t+1) 
MAIN EFFECTS      ܵܽݐଓݏ݂ܽܿݐଓ݋݊௃஽௉஺
(௧)෣  3.93*** -0.71 0.05 -9.15*** -2.10 
 (1.14) (0.54)) (0.08) (1.19) (1.08) 
      
CONTROLS      
Firm Size(t) 0.03
*** 0.05*** 0.02** 0.16*** 0.15*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) 
Diversification(t) -0.01 -0.90
** 0.02 -0.15 0.05 
 (0.01) (0.30) (0.05) (0.71) (0.04) 
Utility Type Index(t) -0.78 -0.34 0.02 1.25
* 1.64 
 (0.52) (1.23) (0.03) (0.51) (1.62) 
Outage Index(t) 0.02 -0.12
** -0.01 0.13* 0.04 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.01) (0.06) (0.07) 
      
TESTS      
Likelihood Ratio F2 472.33*** 1,362.74***    
      
Notes:  *** significant at p<0.001; ** significant at p<0.01; * significant at p<0.05. Standard errors in parentheses. Simultaneous 
estimation of Profits and modified version of 1B equations (not shown and excluding demographics), and Revenues, Costs 
and modified version of 1B equations (not show and excluding demographics), via 2SLS with fixed-effects and 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (FE-HAC) standard errors. J.D. Power data used to address potential 
state-level differences. Year and state dummies included. Demographics excluded due to collinearity with State dummies. 
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APPENDIX 4 
EFFECT OF DEMOGRAPHIC-DETERMINED EXOGENOUS SATISFACTION 
ON UTILITY FIRM PROFITS AND OPERATING COSTS 
UNSTANDARDIZED 
ESTIMATES 
Profit(t+1) SVOC(t+1) 
MAIN EFFECTS   ܵܽݐଓݏ݂ܽܿݐଓ݋݊ா௑ைீாேை௎ௌ
(௧)෣  9.90*** -9.01** 
 (1.02) (2.86) 
   
CONTROLS   
Firm Size(t) 0.05
*** -0.01* 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Rates(t) 10.24
** 30.14*** 
 (3.66) (5.65) 
Outage Index(t) -0.01
** 0.01* 
 (0.00) (0.01) 
Diversification(t) 0.67 -5.13 
 (1.12) (4.00) 
   
TESTS   
Wald F2 564.31*** 325.14*** 
   
Notes: *** significant at p<0.001; ** significant at p<0.01; * significant at p<0.05. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Satisfaction(t)EXOGENOUS is an alternative instrument, estimated as the variance explained in customer satisfaction by 
residential customer demographics, in a first-stage model, and used to instrument second-stage equations reported. 
Simultaneous estimation of Profits and SVOC equations and modified version of 1B equation (not show and 
excluding demographics), via 2SLS with fixed-effects and heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (FE-
HAC) standard errors. Year dummies included. Demographics used to calibrate the alternative instrument and 
excluded from Profits and SVOC equations. 
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